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various contemporary attitude theorists have made a distinction 
between explicit and implicit measures of attitudes. Explicit measures tap 
into the evaluations that people can self-report. In contrast, implicit mea-
sures attempt to assess attitudes that come to mind automatically, without 
requiring self-report. People are invariably aware of the attitudes reported 
on explicit measures, but they might or might not be aware of the attitudes 
assessed with implicit measures (Petty, Fazio, & Briñol, 2009a).
Although the implicit–explicit attitude distinction has become very pop-
ular recently (see reviews by Gawronski & Payne, 2010; Petty, Fazio, & Bri-
ñol, 2009b; Wittenbrink & Schwarz, 2007), it has been around in one form or 
another for a long time. For example, in their classic treatise on persuasion, 
Hovland, Janis, and Kelley (1953) defined attitudes as “implicit responses” 
that are “sometimes unconscious” and “oriented toward approaching or 
avoiding a given object” (p. 7). Attitudes were contrasted with opinions, 
which are “verbal answers that one covertly expresses to (oneself)” (p. 8). 
These private opinions were further distinguished from public opinions that 
could be susceptible to social desirability motives. Today, one might say that 
their use of the term attitude referred to the underlying (implicit) evaluative 
association, whereas opinion referred to the explicit or deliberative evalua-
tion. Although, in Hovland’s day, all that could be measured were explicit 
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evaluations, today it is possible to assess automatic evaluative associations 
as well (e.g., Fazio, Jackson, Dunton, & Williams, 1995; Greenwald, McGhee, 
& Schwartz, 1998). Hovland and colleagues (1953) assumed that explicit and 
implicit attitudes would generally correspond, but available research now 
makes it clear that implicit and explicit measures can reveal quite different 
(even opposite) evaluations.
Of most relevance to this volume is that the new implicit measures have 
led to new developments with respect to classic notions of cognitive consis-
tency. For example, whereas early studies showed that people could experi-
ence imbalance (Heider, 1958) when their explicit cognitions about different 
objects were not in accord with each other (e.g., “People I like do not like the 
same things that I do”), more current research suggests that the same can be 
true when there is imbalance among evaluations assessed with implicit mea-
sures (e.g., Gawronski, Walther, & Blank, 2005). Importantly, implicit imbal-
ance can occur even when everything is balanced at the explicit level and 
implicit balance can occur even if explicit cognitions are imbalanced (Green-
wald et al., 2002). For these situations to arise, of course, implies that implicit 
and explicit evaluations differ from each other for at least one of the elements 
in the cognitive system.
When implicit and explicit evaluations of a single attitude object differ, 
we refer to this situation as implying a state of implicit ambivalence toward 
the attitude object. Explicit ambivalence has been much studied and refers to 
a situation in which people endorse both positive and negative aspects of a 
given attitude object (e.g., “I like ice-cream because of its great taste, but I 
don’t like it when I think of the high calories”; Kaplan, 1972). This ambiva-
lence is explicit in that people report both positive and negative features of 
the attitude object on self-report scales, and when asked also report being 
ambivalent with respect to the attitude object (Priester & Petty, 1996; Thomp-
son, Zanna, & Griffin, 1996). In contrast to explicit ambivalence, people with 
implicit ambivalence do not label themselves as ambivalent, because at 
the explicit level they do not endorse conflicting evaluations of the object. 
Rather, implicit ambivalence occurs when people are either unaware of the 
evaluative conflict (e.g., aware of their positive but not their negative reac-
tions to the object), or are aware of having both positive and negative reac-
tions, but deny that one reaction is valid or believe it stems from some source 
other than their personal views (e.g., from media bias). Thus, as we explain 
in more detail shortly, people can be implicitly ambivalent toward an atti-
tude object even if there is no explicit ambivalence. However, despite not 
labeling their reaction as ambivalent, we argue that implicit ambivalence is 
consequential.
We begin the chapter by very briefly describing some work on implicit 
imbalance—a type of inconsistency involving multiple attitude objects. Then, 
we turn to the main focus of this chapter, which is implicit ambivalence. We 
address issues such as how and why implicit ambivalence occurs, and what 
its consequences are. Unlike the principle of balance that seems to operate 
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at the primary level of thinking, implicit ambivalence requires a consider-
ation of secondary, metacognitive labels, along with primary cognitions. In 
the last part of the chapter, we introduce recent research suggesting a means 
to reduce implicit ambivalence.
BALANCE
Explicit Balance
Balance principles (Heider, 1958; see also Abelson et al., 1968; Festinger, 
1957) apply to many aspects of attitudes and persuasion. Heider proposed 
that three elements in a cognitive system (e.g., self, other, object) could either 
be in an evaluatively balanced state (e.g., a person agreeing about the value 
of some object with another person who is liked, or disagreeing about the 
value of some object with another person who is disliked) or in an imbal-
anced state (e.g., a person disagreeing about the value of some object with 
another person who is liked, or agreeing about the value of some object with 
another person who is disliked). Balanced triads can involve any three cogni-
tive elements that are associated in some way (e.g., “I like myself and I have 
nice things” is balanced, whereas “I dislike myself and I have nice things” 
is not).1 Importantly, Heider held that imbalanced systems were unpleasant 
and unstable, and tended to move toward balance. This theory can account 
for why a person would come to like a political candidate more after he or 
she is endorsed by a favored celebrity. The theory holds that imbalance can 
lead to attitude change toward the candidate (or the endorser) in the direc-
tion of producing balance.
Implicit Balance
Recently, Greenwald et al. (2002) proposed a unified theory of implicit social 
cognition in which the essential ingredients of Heider’s theory of psycho-
logical balance were applied to automatically activated cognition (see 
Cvencek, Greenwald, & Meltzoff, Chapter 8, this volume). The core elements 
in the unified theory are self, group, and valence (attitude), but the frame-
work would presumably be applicable to all of the elements addressed by 
Heider’s original theory. In the unified theory, the self can be automatically 
associated with one or more (nonvalenced) group concepts (e.g., “I am a 
Democrat”), and the self and group elements can be automatically associ-
ated with a particular valenced node (e.g., positive–negative). Greenwald 
and his colleagues examined the coherence among these three constructs 
using implicit measures. For example, in one study with female students 
examining gender identity, the authors measured three types of associa-
tions: self–gender (gender identity), self–valence (self-attitude), and gender–
valence (gender attitude). In line with the predictions of balance theory, they 
found that ingroup attitudes were the result of a multiplicative function of 
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the strengths of ingroup identity and self-attitude (Greenwald et al., 2002); 
that is, the stronger the automatic associations between the self and female 
and the self and good, the stronger the automatic linkage between female 
and good. Interestingly, the balance effects at the implicit level were stronger 
than any balance effects at the explicit level.
Other studies have taken the implicit balance notion beyond self–group 
links. For example, research by Brunel, Tietje, and Greenwald (2004) revealed 
that Macintosh computer users showed stronger automatic evaluative asso-
ciations for that brand relative to PC users, as revealed both in positivity 
(brand–good) and in self associations (brand–self). Indeed, objects, products, 
and brands can be part of the self-concept and contribute to defining one’s 
identity (e.g., Aaker, 1999; Belk, 1988; James, 1890; Kleine, Kleine, & Kernan, 
1993; Wicklund & Gollwitzer, 1982). Finally, some relevant research has exam-
ined the possibility of a more dynamic approach to balance by manipulating 
the relationship between two concepts and assessing their consequences for 
the relationship with the third concept (Gawronski, Bodenhausen, & Becker, 
2007; Walther & Trasselli, 2003).
In research particularly relevant to persuasion, Horcajo, Briñol, and Petty 
(2010) showed that asking participants to think about persuasive messages 
can also lead to associated changes on automatic measures through a process 
of spreading activation guided by the attainment of psychological balance. 
In one study, participants were asked to generate arguments in favor of or 
against including more vegetables in their diet, linking vegetables to either 
goodness or badness. Then, they completed an implicit measure (the Implicit 
Association Test [IAT]) designed to assess the automatic link between veg-
etables and the self, as well as a measure of implicit self-esteem (Greenwald 
et al., 2002). Consistent with the idea of balance, participants showed more 
automatic self–vegetable associations after thinking about why vegetables 
were good rather than bad, and these effects were only apparent for those 
with high implicit self-esteem (i.e., those with stronger automatic associa-
tions between the self and good rather than bad). For individuals with low 
implicit self-esteem there was a nonsignificant tendency toward stronger 
associations between self and vegetables after thinking about the negative 
consequences of consuming vegetables. According to balance theory, self-
esteem should matter, because balance occurs when good people have good 
objects linked to the self, but bad people have bad objects linked to the self.
In a second study, Horcajo and colleagues (2010) provided further evi-
dence for the dynamic relationship between the three concepts under exami-
nation (self, vegetable, and attitude). In this study participants received false 
feedback about their self-concept to increase or decrease the perceived link-
age between the self and vegetables. Specifically, after completing a relevant 
IAT they were told that their self-concept was strongly associated with either 
vegetables or animals. Then, the impact of this induction was assessed on an 
implicit measure of attitudes toward vegetables (i.e., the link between vege-
tables and their valence), as moderated by scores on implicit self-esteem (i.e., 
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the link between the self and its valence). It was predicted and found that 
the false feedback increasing the self–vegetable linkage led to more favor-
able implicit attitudes toward vegetables, but only for those with relatively 
high implicit self-esteem. As in the prior study, self-esteem matters, because 
if vegetables become linked to the self, the situation is balanced when veg-
etables are seen as good only so long as one likes oneself. If one dislikes 
oneself and vegetables become linked to the self, balance occurs if vegetables 
are seen as bad.
The research by Horcajo et al. (2010) makes several advances over previ-
ous work on implicit balance. The most important of these extensions is to 
add to the research moving implicit balance from a relatively static to a more 
dynamic view (see also Gawronski et al., 2005; Langer, Walther, Gawronski, 
& Blank, 2009); that is, whereas the initial research on implicit balance by 
Greenwald and colleagues (2002) focused on the examination of implicitly 
measured constructs (e.g., the self, a group, and valence), the Horcajo et al. 
(2010) research took a more experimental approach to examine implicit bal-
ance in which one link was manipulated and the effects on the other links 
were observed. Overall, the evidence suggests that regardless of whether one 
takes a relatively static or a more dynamic approach, the results are highly 
consistent with the notion of implicit balance (see Cvencek et al., Chapter 8, 
this volume, for additional discussion).
AMBIVALENCE
Although imbalance results from inconsistency with respect to multiple atti-
tude objects, and ambivalence results from inconsistency regarding just one 
object, there are number of similarities between these two kinds of inconsis-
tency. First, both balance and ambivalence approaches assume that people 
can simultaneously hold incompatible beliefs, attitudes, feelings, and behav-
ioral tendencies regarding the self, others, and objects. Second, literature in 
both paradigms has documented that such conflicts are typically aversive. 
Virtually every consistency theory holds that internal discrepancies are 
unpleasant and often result in negative affect (e.g., Abelson & Rosenberg, 
1958; Higgins, 1987; Newcomb, 1978; Osgood & Tannenbaum, 1955). Third, 
both approaches postulate that people’s attempts to deal with internal dis-
crepancies in one way or another sometimes lead to attitude change in the 
service of restoring consistency. For balance, we have seen that change can 
occur at both explicit and implicit levels.
Along with these similarities, there are also notable differences. First, 
as noted earlier, balance effects operate at the primary level of cognition. 
Primary thoughts are those that involve our initial associations of some object 
with some attribute, such as “I am female” or “I am a good person.” Follow-
ing a primary thought, people can also generate other thoughts that occur at 
a second level, which involve reflections on the first-level thoughts (e.g., “I 
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am not sure how good a person I really am”). Metacognition refers to these 
second-order thoughts, or our thoughts about our thoughts or thought pro-
cesses (Briñol & DeMarree, in press; Jost, Kruglanski, & Nelson, 1998; Petty, 
Briñol, Tormala, & Wegener, 2007). As we explain shortly, unlike implicit 
imbalance, implicit ambivalence involves secondary levels of cognition, as 
well as primary cognition.
Another distinction between balance and ambivalence is that the reso-
lution of imbalance appears to occur spontaneously, whereas ambivalence 
(more like cognitive dissonance; see Festinger, 1957) requires people to 
search for solutions. Perhaps the most common approach to dealing with 
ambivalence is enhanced thinking or processing of information relevant to 
the object of discrepancy (e.g., Abelson et al., 1968; Aronson, 1969; Festinger, 
1957; Hass, Katz, Rizzo, Bailey, & Moore, 1992; Maio, Bell, & Esses, 1996). By 
considering additional information, and especially attitude-consistent mate-
rial (Clark, Wegener, & Fabrigar, 2008), individuals presumably hope to gain 
enough information to resolve or minimize their ambivalence, or at least the 
subjective discomfort that results from it (e.g., Hänze, 2001; Hodson, Maio, & 
Esses, 2001; Jonas, Diehl, & Bromer, 1997; Katz, Wackenhut, & Hass, 1986).2
The Metacognitive Model
As noted earlier, explicit ambivalence occurs when people have mixed eval-
uative reactions to any one attitude object; that is, they recognize that there 
are both good and bad features of the object. Although there are a number of 
ways to conceptualize ambivalence (e.g., see Priester & Petty, 1996; van Har-
reveld, van der Pligt, & de Liver, 2009), we use a model of attitude structure 
called the metacognitive model (MCM; Petty, 2006; Petty & Briñol, 2006; 2009; 
Petty, Briñol, & DeMarree, 2007). The MCM makes a number of assumptions 
about attitudes. First, in accord with a view of attitudes as stored representa-
tions (e.g., Fazio, 1995, 2007; Fiske & Pavelchak, 1986) rather than momentary 
constructions (e.g., Schwarz, 2007; Wilson & Hodges, 1992), the MCM holds 
that attitude objects can be linked in memory to global evaluative associa-
tions, and these associations can vary in their accessibility (see Fazio, 1995, 
for a review). For many attitude objects, one evaluation (relatively positive 
or negative) is dominant and represents the integration of knowledge about 
the object. For example, the top panel of Figure 9.1 shows a person with an 
explicitly positive attitude toward smoking. In such situations, this evalua-
tion would come to mind upon encountering the attitude object, though the 
speed at which this occurs can vary (e.g., see Bargh, Chaiken, Raymond, & 
Hymes, 1996; Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell, & Kardes, 1986).
Second, and more importantly, in concert with idea that the positivity 
and negativity underlying attitudes are separable (e.g., Cacioppo, Gardner, 
& Berntson, 1997), the MCM holds that attitude objects can sometimes be 
linked in memory to evaluative associations of opposite valence (see also de 
Liver, et al., 2007; Petty, Tormala, Briñol, & Jorns, 2006). In such cases, a per-
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son would have explicit ambivalence regarding the attitude object, because 
the object is linked to both positivity and negativity. Panel 2 in Figure 9.1 
depicts a person who views smoking as having both positive and negative 
aspects and thus is explicitly ambivalent. In this illustration, the link to good 
is stronger than the link to bad, perhaps because negativity toward smoking 
is more recent and less practiced. It is important to note, however, that not all 
attitude objects are expected to have a bivalent structure.
Third, the most unique feature of the MCM, and the one that gives the 
model its name, is the assumption that people can tag their evaluative asso-
ciations as true or false, or held with varying degrees of confidence. In this 
way, the model builds on prior research on attitude certainty (e.g., Gross, 
Holtz, & Miller, 1995) and on metacognition more generally (Jost et al., 1998; 
see Petty, Briñol, Tormala, et al., 2007). These validating metacognitions can 
vary in the strength of their association to the linked evaluation, and the 
strength of the attitude–validity link will determine the speed and likelihood 
that the perceived validity of an evaluation will be retrieved along with the 
evaluation itself. Most notably, perhaps, the MCM goes beyond the idea that 
attitude validation is solely an online process and contends that perceived 
validities, like the evaluations themselves, can be stored for later retrieval (cf. 
Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006).
Finally, the MCM concurs with research on cognitive negation, which 
suggests that untagged evaluations are presumed to be true unless evidence 
FIGURE 9.1. Metacognitive model of attitude structure depiction of univalence 
(Panel 1), explicit ambivalence (Panel 2) and implicit ambivalence (Panel 3). Adapted 
from Petty, Briñol, and DeMarree (2007). Copyright 2007 by Guilford Publications, 
Inc. Adapted by permission.
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against them has been generated. This proposal is analogous to Gilbert’s sug-
gestion that information initially held as true needs to be tagged as “false” to 
be disbelieved (Gilbert, 1991; Gilbert, Krull, & Malone, 1990; Gilbert, Tafar-
odi, & Malone, 1993). Only if the false tag is retrieved will a person who 
disbelieves an assertion or has abandoned an attitude recognize it as false. 
Otherwise, the person will act upon the belief or attitude as if it were true. 
The accumulated research suggests that successful negation is quite diffi-
cult, though not impossible (Deutsch, Gawronski, & Strack, 2006). Negation 
is particularly difficult with respect to automatic evaluation when people 
first believe something and only at some subsequent point in time come to 
learn that it is wrong (Gregg, Seibt, & Banaji, 2006; Petty, Tormala, Briñol, & 
Jarvis, 2006). If a false tag is applied immediately to a new statement, it can 
be effective in correcting immediate evaluations on both explicit and implicit 
measures (Peters & Gawronski, 2011), though at some later point in time 
even immediate negations can be forgotten, leaving people to think that the 
negated assertion is valid (e.g., Priester, Wegener, Petty, & Fabrigar, 1999; 
Ross, Lepper, & Hubbard, 1975).
Feeling ambivalent is associated with a number of important con-
sequences. As noted earlier, subjective ambivalence, like other forms of 
inconsistency, is often experienced as an unpleasant state (Newby-Clark, 
McGregor, & Zanna, 2002). In this regard, ambivalence differs from indiffer-
ence. Although both ambivalent and indifferent individuals could express 
a “neutral” or moderate attitude on a bipolar scale (Kaplan, 1972), for an 
ambivalent person various positive and negative reactions are jointly acti-
vated, whereas for an indifferent person there are few positive and negative 
reactions. An indifferent person is better characterized as having a “non-
attitude” that is not associated with as much discomfort as ambivalence 
(Converse, 1970). In addition to ambivalence being associated with discom-
fort, the more ambivalence one experiences regarding an object, the less 
functional one’s attitude becomes in orienting one’s behavior (Armitage & 
Conner, 2000; Sparks, Harris, & Lockwood, 2004). Consistent with this idea, 
people with ambivalent (vs. univalent or indifferent) attitudes tend to be 
slower to report their attitudes (Bargh, Chaiken, Govender, & Pratto, 1992) 
and are more sensitive to context effects (Tourangeau, Rasinski, Bradburn, 
& D’Andrade, 1989). Given that subjective ambivalence tends to be a nega-
tive state, people are motivated to address it. For example, the motivation to 
reduce ambivalence can lead people to pay careful attention to information 
that might help them undermine or resolve their ambivalence (e.g., Maio et 
al., 1996).
Implicit Ambivalence
Although classic work on ambivalence considers situations in which people 
hold both positive and negative evaluations that are considered valid (see 
Panel 2 in Figure 9.1), the MCM holds open the possibility that people can 
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have two opposite accessible evaluations, but one is seen as valid, whereas 
the other is rejected (see Panel 3 of Figure 9.1). A denied evaluation can be 
a past attitude (e.g., “I used to like smoking, but now it is disgusting”) or 
an association that was never endorsed but is nonetheless salient due to 
one’s culture (e.g., the media depicting smoking as glamorous; cf. Mon-
teith, Devine, & Zuwerink, 1993). In such cases (Panel 3 of Figure 9.1), the 
MCM refers to the attitude structure as one of implicit ambivalence (Petty, Tor-
mala, Briñol, & Jarvis, 2006). Even though people do not explicitly endorse 
opposite evaluations of the same attitude object, they can nevertheless feel 
uncomfortable about such attitude objects, without recognizing the specific 
source of the conflict (see Epstein, 2003; Petty & Briñol, 2009; Rydell, McCon-
nell, & Mackie, 2008). The ambivalence is not explicit, because people do not 
endorse both positive and negative evaluations. Indeed, people can report 
being confidently unambivalent in such cases (e.g., “I am sure that I am not 
ambivalent about smoking”; Clarkson, Tormala, & Rucker, 2008). However, 
the underlying structure of the attitude could still suggest conflict, because 
the attitude object is associated with both automatically activated positivity 
and negativity.
According to the MCM, implicit ambivalence is suspected whenever 
there is a discrepancy in the valence of an attitude uncovered by a delibera-
tive (explicit) versus automatic (implicit) measure. This is because in situa-
tions where people have opposite evaluative associations but reject one of 
them, a deliberative measure would be influenced primarily by the endorsed 
association, whereas a measure of automatic evaluation would tap into both 
endorsed and unendorsed associations. In the example depicted in Panel 3 
of Figure 9.1, a deliberative attitude measure would reflect an unfavorable 
assessment of smoking, but an implicit measure would be more positive. 
The prediction of implicit ambivalence from implicit–explicit discrepancies 
stands in contrast to theories that assume that implicit and explicit measures 
tap into independent “dual attitudes” (see Wilson, Lindsey, & Schooler, 
2000) that are stored in separate brain regions (see DeCoster, Banner, Smith, 
& Semin, 2006), stem from qualitatively different processes (see Rydell & 
McConnell, 2006; Rydell, McConnell, Mackie, & Strain, 2006), and operate in 
distinct situations (see Dovidio, Kawakami, Johnson, Johnson, & Howard, 
1997).
Implicit–Explicit Discrepancies as a Source  
of Implicit Ambivalence
If discrepancies between implicit and explicit measures tap an implicit 
ambivalence, then such discrepancies should be associated with some dis-
comfort regarding the attitude object that would lead to efforts at resolu-
tion. As noted earlier, one well-known consequence of the discomfort that 
emerges from explicit ambivalence is that it leads to enhanced processing 
of relevant information in a presumed attempt to resolve the ambivalence. 
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In one study testing the notion that explicit–implicit discrepancies could 
likewise lead to enhanced information processing (Briñol, Petty, & Wheeler, 
2006), undergraduates’ self-evaluations were assessed with both automatic 
(IAT; Greenwald & Farnham, 2000) and deliberative (Rosenberg, 1965) self-
esteem measures, then the absolute value of the difference between the two 
standardized measures was calculated as the index of discrepancy. Next, 
participants were exposed to either a strong or weak message about eating 
vegetables that was framed as self-relevant or not. An example of a strong 
argument in favor of vegetable consumption was that vegetables have more 
vitamins than most vitamin supplements on the market, making them par-
ticularly beneficial during exam and workout periods. The gist of one weak 
argument in favor of vegetables was that vegetables are becoming more pop-
ular for wedding celebrations because they are colorful and look beautiful 
on plates. The degree to which participants processed the message informa-
tion was assessed by examining the extent to which the quality of the argu-
ments affected postmessage attitudes toward vegetables. People’s attitudes 
should be more affected by the quality of the message arguments when they 
are thinking carefully about information, than when they are not thinking 
carefully (see Petty & Cacioppo, 1986).
The results of this study revealed that when the message was framed 
as self-relevant, the extent of explicit–implicit discrepancy interacted with 
argument quality to affect attitudes. The greater the discrepancy, the more 
participants’ attitudes differentiated strong from weak arguments. However, 
when the same strong and weak messages were framed as irrelevant to the 
self (i.e., the message was said to be about the properties of vegetables rather 
than the self), discrepancy did not interact with argument quality to predict 
attitudes. This suggests that explicit–implicit discrepancies do not lead to 
motivation to process all information—only information that is relevant to 
the object for which the discrepancy exists. Furthermore, the direction of the 
discrepancy (i.e., whether implicit or explicit self-esteem was greater did not 
further moderate the results.
Attitude Change as a Source of Implicit Ambivalence
In addition to examining discrepancies that already exist, we have also 
investigated implicit–explicit discrepancies created in the laboratory. Spe-
cifically, in a series of studies, we examined whether changing a person’s 
attitude from one valence to another would produce implicit ambivalence. 
According to the MCM, explicit attitude change from one valence to another 
could produce implicit ambivalence, because one evaluative association (the 
old one) is now rejected and a new, opposite evaluative association is cre-
ated, producing a pattern like that in Panel 3 of Figure 9.1. In this depiction, 
an explicit measure would primarily assess the new attitude, whereas an 
implicit measure would still show some influence of the old attitude, result-
ing in a discrepancy. In support of this notion, one study (see Gregg, Seibt, 
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& Banaji, 2006) found that when an initially disliked group subsequently 
became likable, explicit attitudes toward the group were influenced to reflect 
the new information, but implicit attitude measures still reflected the origi-
nal dislike, resulting in an implicit–explicit discrepancy. According to the 
MCM, an implicit measure was especially likely to reflect the old attitude 
after explicit attitudes changed to the extent that the old attitude was initially 
highly accessible, such as when it was based on many rehearsals or extensive 
thought (see Wyer, 2010, for supporting evidence). In order to effectively 
reduce the impact of an initial attitude, it helps if the initial attitude is explic-
itly rejected at the same time that a new one is formed (Peters & Gawronski, 
2011) and the information on which the new attitude is based is thought 
about carefully (Dempsey & Mitchell, 2010). These factors strengthen the 
new attitude relative to the old one.
To examine whether attitude change could lead people to show implicit 
ambivalence toward the attitude object that was the target of change, Petty 
and colleagues (2006) conducted a series of studies in which explicit attitudes 
were changed from one valence to another and information processing was 
then assessed. In one of the studies in this line of research, undergraduate 
students were first classically conditioned to like or dislike a target individual 
(Staats & Staats, 1958). Then, participants received information about the tar-
get individual’s attitudes on several important topics. The attitudinal infor-
mation was designed to get the participant either to like or dislike the target 
by having the target agree or disagree with the participant on several atti-
tude issues (Byrne, 1971). In some conditions, this information had the same 
valence as the conditioning manipulation, so that no attitude change would 
occur, and in other conditions the information was opposite in valence to the 
conditioning. In the latter situation, an earlier study showed that individuals 
rejected their initial evaluation based on conditioning and adopted a new 
evaluation based on the similarity information. Next, participants were told 
that the target person was a candidate for a job at their university. To evalu-
ate the candidate, participants were provided with either a strong, impres-
sive résumé or a weak, unimpressive one. The key result was that attitudes 
toward the target as a job candidate were more influenced by résumé quality 
among participants whose attitudes were changed than among those whose 
attitudes toward the candidate had not been changed; that is, despite having 
the same current explicit attitude toward the target, people who held this 
attitude as a result of changing it engaged in greater information process-
ing than those who had held this attitude all along. It was as if the changed 
group was attempting to resolve some underlying ambivalence regarding 
the candidate. This result held even though participants did not report being 
any more explicitly ambivalent (i.e., having any more mixed reactions) about 
the candidate as a function of changing their attitudes.
In a conceptual replication of our procedure, Rydell et al. (2008) exam-
ined whether people who changed their attitudes experienced more discom-
fort than people who did not change their attitudes, and whether this dis-
 implicit Ambivalence 189
comfort was responsible for the enhanced information processing observed. 
In their research, participants were first exposed to either positive or nega-
tive associative information (based on a subliminal word prime) about a tar-
get person. Then, participants received positive or negative verbal informa-
tion about the behaviors of the target. As in the Petty et al. (2006) design, in 
some conditions the verbal information had the same valence as the initial 
associative (priming) information, so that no attitude change would occur, 
and in other conditions the information was opposite in valence to the initial 
information, so that attitude change was induced. After these inductions, 
participants were exposed to a final set of information relevant to the target 
person that comprised either strong or weak arguments.
There were several notable findings from this study. First, Rydell et al. 
(2008) found that attitude change was associated with increased informa-
tion processing as evidenced by a greater impact of argument quality on 
attitudes, replicating the Petty et al. (2006) results. Furthermore, attitude 
change was associated with greater reports of general discomfort regard-
ing the attitude object compared to no change. Of most interest, Rydell and 
colleagues (2008) showed that the measure of general discomfort mediated 
the observed information-processing effect, supporting the idea that implicit 
ambivalence is uncomfortable and enhances information processing. This 
discomfort does not result from any explicit conflict, however. Rather, the 
discomfort stems from the conflict between an endorsed and an unendorsed 
evaluative association regarding the attitude object.
Implicit Ambivalence in Racial Attitudes
The research described so far provides convergent evidence for the viabil-
ity of the implicit ambivalence idea. Another area of research that is consis-
tent with this notion is in the domain of prejudice in racial attitudes. There 
are now a number of studies suggesting that European American (White) 
individuals sometimes engage in greater processing of a persuasive mes-
sage when it comes from a Black person rather than a White person (e.g., 
White & Harkins, 1994). Petty, Fleming, and White (1999) suggested that this 
enhanced scrutiny might be due to the motive of Whites to guard against 
possible prejudice (from themselves or others) toward Black sources (i.e., 
watchdog motivation). Thus, they found that individuals low in prejudice 
were most likely to show the enhanced scrutiny effect, because they pre-
sumably were most concerned about scrutinizing information from a Black 
source to avoid showing any bias. The enhanced scrutiny also occurs when 
the information is about a Black target rather than from a Black source (Flem-
ing, Petty, & White, 2005).
In a recent series of studies, we tested a variation of the watchdog 
hypothesis based on the idea of implicit ambivalence (Johnson, Petty, Briñol, 
See, & Fleming, 2011b). Specifically, the implicit ambivalence notion sug-
gests that among individuals low in explicit (i.e., deliberative) prejudice, it 
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is those who are also high in implicit (i.e., automatic) prejudice who will 
do the most processing; that is, people who do not want to be prejudiced, 
or who see themselves as unprejudiced (low explicit prejudice) but harbor 
automatic negative reactions toward Blacks (high implicit prejudice), should 
experience conflict and be the most vigilant in guarding against prejudice 
(Devine, Monteith, Zuwerink, & Elliot, 1991; Monteith, 1993; Monteith et al., 
1993). One way to guard against prejudice is to engage in careful process-
ing of messages from Blacks. Although this prediction is consistent with the 
initial watchdog notion, the implicit ambivalence framework also makes a 
novel prediction that individuals who are high in explicit prejudice, but low 
in implicit prejudice, would also engage in enhanced information process-
ing. In watchdog terminology, they would want to be sure that they demon-
strated desired levels of prejudice. In the implicit ambivalence terminology, 
the enhanced processing stems from the discomfort associated with being 
ambivalent at an implicit rather than explicit level.
To examine the implicit ambivalence idea in the domain of prejudice, a 
recent study used both automatic and deliberative measures to assess Ohio 
State University students’ attitudes toward African Americans (Johnson et 
al., 2011b). The automatic measure was an IAT in which stereotypically Black 
names (e.g., Tyrone, LaToya) and White names (e.g., Andrew, Katie) were 
paired with good (e.g., freedom, love) and bad (e.g., poison, disease) terms (see 
Greenwald et al., 1998). The explicit measure comprised a series of statements 
about Blacks (e.g., “On the whole, Black people do not stress education or 
training”) to which participants rated their extent of agreement (see Katz & 
Hass, 1988). The explicit and implicit measures of attitudes were unrelated 
to each other. Following previous research on explicit–implicit divergence 
(Briñol et al., 2006), an index of explicit–implicit discrepancy was formed 
as the absolute value of the difference between the standardized explicit 
and implicit measures of racial attitudes. The direction of discrepancy (i.e., 
implicit score more prejudiced than explicit, or vice versa) was also exam-
ined to see whether it mattered.
After completing the implicit and explicit measures of racial attitudes, all 
of the students were exposed to a message advocating a new program to hire 
African American faculty at their university that was supported with either 
strong or weak arguments. As in past research, the strong arguments were 
designed to elicit favorable thoughts if people thought about them, whereas 
the weak arguments were designed to elicit mostly unfavorable thoughts 
(see Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). Consistent with the idea that people with 
automatic–deliberative discrepancies would act as if they were ambivalent, 
discrepancy interacted with argument quality to predict attitudes toward 
the program; that is, as the discrepancy between racial attitudes assessed 
with implicit and explicit measures increased, attitudes toward the program 
were more affected by argument quality. The direction of the discrepancy 
did not further qualify the results. These findings indicate that among par-
ticipants who were low in explicit prejudice, it was primarily those high in 
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implicit prejudice who engaged in greater scrutiny of a message about a 
program favoring Blacks, consistent with the original watchdog idea (Petty 
et al., 1999). However, among participants high in explicit prejudice, those 
who were low in implicit prejudice engaged in the greatest scrutiny. Overall, 
then, the results are quite compatible with the predictions derived from the 
implicit ambivalence framework.
Notably, Johnson and colleagues (2011b) provided participants’ with 
a topic quite relevant to race—a persuasive message about the hiring of 
African American faculty. According to the implicit ambivalence notion, 
any element of a persuasive proposal relevant to one’s automatic–deliber-
ative racial discrepancies could be sufficient to trigger the discomfort that 
results in increased processing. For example, if instead of having a mes-
sage related to Blacks, participants were exposed to a message presented 
by a Black source, implicit ambivalence would make the same prediction. 
To explore this possibility, in another study, Ohio State students were given 
a message on the race-irrelevant topic of supporting the use of phosphate-
based laundry detergents. The message was presented by either a Black or 
a White communicator (Johnson et al., 2011b). Source race was manipulated 
by the presentation of a photo of either a Black or White male that accompa-
nied the persuasive message participants read. The message was designed 
to argue unambiguously in favor of phosphate detergents and presented 
either strong or weak arguments in support of the proposal (see Briñol, 
Petty, & Tormala, 2004). In addition to measuring participants’ attitudes 
toward phosphate detergents after reading the persuasive message, implicit 
and explicit racial attitudes were also assessed. The implicit measure was an 
IAT in which photos of Black and White faces were paired with evaluative 
stimuli (e.g., the terms vomit, freedom; see Greenwald et al., 1998). For the 
explicit measure, participants provided their extent of agreement with vari-
ous statements about Blacks (see Katz & Hass, 1988). In accord with the first 
study, the explicit and implicit measures of racial attitudes were unrelated 
to each other, and an index of explicit–implicit discrepancy was formed as 
the absolute value of the difference between the standardized explicit and 
implicit measures.
Consistent with the idea that people engage in greater information pro-
cessing when a message is relevant to their implicit–explicit discrepancies, a 
significant three-way interaction of source race, argument quality, and dis-
crepancy was obtained. Decomposing the interaction as a function of source 
race revealed that discrepancy only led to an enhanced impact of argument 
quality on attitudes toward phosphate detergents when the source of the 
persuasive message was Black. Furthermore, consistent with the first study, 
the direction of the discrepancy did not further qualify the results. These 
findings suggest that individuals who are implicitly ambivalent—high in 
implicit but low in explicit prejudice, or the reverse—engage in greater infor-
mation processing connected to the discrepancy (i.e., message from a Black 
source). In summary, much like explicit ambivalence, ambivalence at the 
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implicit level also leads to greater information processing, presumably in the 
service of reducing the discomfort that results from the discrepancy.
Meaningful Negation in Racial Attitudes
In line with the MCM, the research described so far reveals that when people 
doubt the validity of a stored association (and therefore do not use it when 
deliberatively responding), that association can still create what we have 
called implicit ambivalence and thereby have an impact on information pro-
cessing. Thus, although people might not report being explicitly ambivalent 
about a given object or group, the discomfort associated with the object of 
implicit ambivalence is nonetheless consequential.
Although we have reviewed research showing that people who are 
implicitly ambivalent engage in greater information processing than those 
who are not, we have not shown that this processing is effective in remov-
ing the ambivalence. Indeed, it might not be effective, because ambivalent 
individuals are likely to aim to bolster their endorsed evaluation, leaving 
the negated association in tact. One might wonder, then, whether implicit 
ambivalence can be undermined by strengthening the negation tag for the 
nonendorsed association, so that it would be activated automatically. Inter-
estingly, recent research suggests that this may be difficult. Indeed, some 
available research indicates that attempts to negate one’s prejudice can back-
fire and actually strengthen the unfavorable evaluation. In particular, in 
one highly relevant study, Gawronski, Deutsch, Mbirkou, Seibt, and Strack 
(2008) attempted to train participants either to negate information that was 
consistent with the Black stereotype (i.e., hitting the space bar on a keyboard 
to indicate “no” whenever a Black person was paired with a negative trait) 
or to affirm stereotype-inconsistent information (i.e., hitting the space bar 
to indicate “yes” whenever a Black person was paired with a positive trait). 
This research found that only affirming stereotype-inconsistent information 
was effective in undermining automatic prejudice. In contrast, attempting 
to negate prejudice actually made the link between Black and bad stronger, 
enhancing automatic prejudice.
However, the MCM suggests the possibility that continual practice 
in negating unfavorable traits can lead to a stored negation tag and could 
at some point lead the person immediately to think “no” when negative 
traits are activated, undermining prejudice (e.g., “not lazy” is automatically 
activated and seen as positive; see also Maddux, Barden, Brewer, & Petty, 
2005). Is there any evidence that practice in negation can be successful? In a 
highly relevant series of studies, Deutsch et al. (2006) had participants prac-
tice negating relatively novel positive or negative words and timed how 
long it took for them to indicate the reversed meaning of the phrase (e.g., 
“no disease” is positive and “no party” is negative) compared to affirma-
tions (e.g., “party” is positive or “disease” is negative). The key result was 
that initially people took significantly longer to indicate the correct evalu-
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ative meaning of a negation than an affirmation. However, after numerous 
practice trials, people became as fast to process the meaning of negations 
as they were initially to recognize the meaning of affirmations. In a second 
set of studies, Deutsch et al. compared the meaning of negations on both 
explicit and implicit measures. On explicit measures, negations were eas-
ily understood, but on a measure of automatic evaluation, words negated 
relatively infrequently showed the same evaluation as the affirmation (e.g., 
“no disease” activated as much negativity as “disease”). However, for more 
frequently encountered negations (e.g., “no problem”), the intended mean-
ing was apparent on an automatic measure. Although this is a correlational 
study, Deutsch et al. argued that this result is consistent with the idea that 
with very extensive practice, negation can be successful in reversing specific 
word meanings. Thus, the Deutsch et al. studies suggest that, with practice, 
it might be possible for negation training to undermine specific stereotypes; 
that is, continued practice in thinking that Blacks are not lazy could mean 
that if “lazy” were activated in association with Black, it could be negated 
sufficiently quickly that its valence would reverse, producing a reduction in 
automatic prejudice.
Given that there is some suggestive evidence that negation can be suc-
cessful in reversing the meaning of negative terms with extensive practice, 
why has the existing evidence with respect to the negation of racial stereo-
types been unsupportive? In a recent series of studies, Johnson, Kopp, and 
Petty (2011) hypothesized that perhaps the negation training used in prior 
research (e.g., Gawronski et al., 2008) did not work because either there 
was insufficient practice or the negation used (i.e., “No”) was somewhat 
ambiguous or insufficiently meaningful or powerful. To examine this idea, 
Johnson et al. (2011a) adapted a design from similar research on negating 
prejudice (see Gawronski et al., 2008; Kawakami, Dovidio, Moll, Hermsen, 
& Russin, 2000) but used a more powerful negation. Specifically, participants 
were trained to hit the space bar on their computer keyboard and think “No! 
That’s wrong!” whenever they saw either a Black face paired with a nega-
tive trait word (e.g., poor) or a White face paired with a positive word (e.g., 
rich). For combinations inconsistent with the cultural stereotype of Blacks 
and Whites, participants were instructed to do nothing—simply to wait for 
the next face–trait combination to appear. In a second condition, the negate 
stereotype-inconsistent condition, participants’ were trained to do just the 
opposite. Specifically, participants’ were told to hit the spacebar and think 
“No! That’s wrong!” each time they saw a Black face paired with a posi-
tive trait or a White face paired with a negative trait. Furthermore, for trials 
in which Black faces were paired with negative traits or White faces were 
paired with positive traits, participants were instructed to give no response 
and wait for the next face–trait combination to appear. Each participant prac-
ticed the training extensively (i.e., five blocks of 40 trials, resulting in 200 total 
trials). Just prior to completing negation training, participants responded to 
the same subliminal evaluative priming task used to assess automatic racial 
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attitudes by Gawronski et al. (2008; see Fazio et al., 1995). They responded to 
this same measure once again, immediately after training.
The results, depicted in Figure 9.2, indicate that participants who 
engaged in negation training of stereotype-consistent information showed 
a decrease in automatic racial prejudice following training. Conversely, 
for those participants who engaged in negation of stereotype-inconsistent 
information, an increase in automatic racial prejudice followed training. 
This pattern resulted in a significant two-way interaction of condition and 
time of measurement. These results suggest that negation training can be 
used as a tool to undermine the validity with which certain associations 
are held and can, in turn, modify automatic attitudes. Furthermore, given 
the differential change in automatic racial prejudice observed for the ste-
reotype consistent and inconsistent training conditions from time 1 to time 
2, it seems unlikely that negation is solely an online process. In order for 
the negation training to impact participants’ automatic racial prejudice, it 
seems likely that the negation was encoded during the training and later 
retrieved spontaneously. Thus, consistent with the MCM, the present work 
supports the idea that negations can be stored along with evaluative associ-
ations in memory for later retrieval (Mayo, Schul, & Burnstein, 2004). Future 
research should examine the consequences of the storage of validity tags 
for implicit ambivalence and information processing; that is, when people 
store the rejection of their associations and this negation is activated auto-
matically, the negated associations might not create implicit ambivalence 
anymore, thereby reducing the motivation to process discrepancy relevant 
information.
FIGURE 9.2. Automatic racial attitudes before and after negation training to prejudice-
consistent and -inconsistent information. Data from Johnson et al. (2011).
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CONCLUSION
In this chapter, we have argued that sometimes people can be implicitly 
ambivalent, even when they do not acknowledge that there are two valid 
sides to an issue (i.e., there is no explicit ambivalence). This prediction is 
based on the MCM of attitude structure, according to which positive and 
negative associations to an attitude object can be stored separately, along 
with metacognitive labels of validity. The research covered in this chapter 
has revealed that when people deny one evaluative reaction as invalid or 
believe it stems from some source other than their personal views, they do 
not use it in their deliberative self-reports, though it can still affect automatic 
evaluations. Furthermore, our research has shown that despite no impact 
on measures of explicit ambivalence, discrepancies between implicit and 
explicit attitudes and attitude change can result in an implicit ambivalence 
that is consequential. Unlike implicit balance that can lead to spontaneous 
changes in attitudes, implicit ambivalence is associated with changes that 
result from enhanced processing of relevant information. We concluded 
with research suggesting that practice in negation might eventually reduce 
implicit ambivalence, though additional research is needed to confirm this 
possibility.
NOTES
1. It is also possible to extend balance theory to more than three cognitive elements 
(e.g., see Insko, 1984, for more details on balance principles).
2. People can deal with ambivalence in ways other than enhanced thinking. These 
include changing discrepant elements (e.g., Festinger, 1957; Harmon-Jones & Mills, 
1999), minimizing the salience or importance of the inconsistency (e.g., Steele & 
Liu, 1981), and ignoring or defensively avoiding discrepancy-related information. 
Although different mechanisms of reducing inconsistency might be substitutable 
for each other (e.g., Tesser, 2001), thinking about target (and ambivalence diag-
nostic) information is a good strategy for discrepancy reduction, because it can 
provide individuals with a solid and stable basis for their attitudes.
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